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Abstract 
 
 
 This study examines the relationship between the state of the U.S. economy and 
the outcome of general elections for incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
The analysis uses a unique data set compiled from a sample of U.S. Congressional 
Elections and state and economic indicators between the years 1999 and 2014. We find 
that economic indicators are consistently related to election outcomes, but have a larger 
and more significant effect when the time period examined is closer to a major economic 
event, such as the Great Recession. We also find that female incumbent candidates are 
more negatively affected by increases in the unemployment rate than their male 
counterparts. The results imply the existence of a gender bias against women in elections 
that consider economic indicators highly. These findings highlight what is of greatest 
importance to the voting electorate during voting season in the 21st century.  
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I. Introduction 
National economic conditions regularly influence both state and national elections. 
Every two years when voters return to the polls for Congressional elections, they are 
faced with the ability to reelect their incumbent or vote a new candidate into office. This 
choice is often linked with the voter’s opinion of the current economic environment. The 
theory of economic voting posits that voters focus only on incumbent candidates and 
consider economic events to evaluate their performances. Since an average voter is not 
directly impacted by or extremely knowledgeable about many specific policies, their 
decision would only take into account common macroeconomic indicators, such as 
income, unemployment, price levels, and growth. Voters then reward incumbent 
candidates for positive conditions by reelecting them or punish them for poor conditions 
by voting in their challenger. The theory and study of economic voting hinges on one 
assumption known as the Responsibility Hypothesis. The Responsibility Hypothesis is 
the belief that voters hold the government responsible for economic events1. This simple 
hypothesis has given a foundation to almost all research into economic voting as it draws 
a connection between the economy and the vote and thus ties together economics and 
political science. This theory would suggest that the voting electorate only considers the 
incumbent candidate and a handful of economic indicators when making their voting 
decision. Yet, does this hypothesis hold water in today’s political climate? It is necessary 
to further analyze the effects of the economy on voting patterns in order to provide a 
better explanation of the priorities of the general electorate.  
                                                
1 Lewis-Beck, M. and M. Paldam, “Economic Voting: An Introduction”  
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Before we proceed, it is important to clarify how candidates are elected to the United 
States Congress. The two chambers of the U.S. Congress consist of the Senate, whose 
100 members serve six-year terms, and the House of Representatives, whose 435 
members serve two-year terms. Congressional elections are held every two years during 
which time the entire House and one third of the Senate is up for election. Unlike the 
president, Senate and House members have no limit on the number of terms they can 
serve. The reason we will be examining Congressional elections is due to the size of the 
governing body and the way candidates are elected. Presidential elections rely on 
Electoral College votes rather than the national popular vote, whereas Congressional 
elections rely solely on the popular vote in each state. We believe the popular vote 
provides a better representation of the will of the electorate and therefore a better 
indication of the effect of the economy on voting.  
There are three types of Congressional elections: primary, general, and special. A 
primary election is a nominating election held by a state’s political party to determine the 
party’s candidate. During a closed primary election, a Democrat would run against a 
Democrat and a Republican against a Republican and only affiliated party members 
would be able to vote for those candidates. Occasionally, open primaries are held where 
non-party members are allowed to vote on party candidates. After Democratic and 
Republican primaries have finished, these candidates (and any others if there is another 
party running) face each other in a general election. In a general election, the whole state 
is given the opportunity to vote on any candidate, regardless of their party affiliation. The 
winner of the general election becomes a member of the next U.S. Congress. A special 
election is held to fill an office that has become vacant between general elections. This 
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usually occurs when a member has resigned or passed away during their term. In this 
situation, the state will hold special primaries and a special general election in order to fill 
the empty position.  
In this research, only general elections that include an incumbent and occur during 
Congressional election years will be considered. Since these elections only happen every 
two years, a considerable amount of time passes between election years. Thus, by only 
examining the past eight congresses, we are able to cover sixteen years of economic 
events. These sixteen years not only provide a large sample size, but they also contain 
several major economic events, such as the Dot Com Boom, the Housing Bubble, and the 
Great Recession. We believe these eight Congressional elections will provide insight to 
the effects of economic voting during both good times and bad.  
With an increasing percentage of women in Congress, it is worthwhile to address the 
effect of gender within economic voting tendencies. Women first reached a level of 10% 
House occupancy in 1993 and have increased this percentage every year since. Yet, it 
was not until the 114th Congress that at least 100 women were elected to serve in the 
Senate and House of Representatives. In the majority of elections, there are only a 
handful of female candidates as compared to males. For example, in 2014, of the 249 
women who filed with the FEC to run for the U.S. House, only 161 made it past primary 
elections, and of them, only 80 were elected to serve in the House2. When women 
outnumber men in 39 states3, what can explain the stunning gender gap in American 
politics? From previous research, we know that male candidates are seen as stronger with 
                                                
2 Women Candidates 2014, Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), Eagleton Institute of 
Politics, Rutgers University. 
3 Schwarz, Hunter. "In Most States, Women Outnumber Men." Washington Post.  
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economic issues while female candidates are stronger with education or health care4. As 
such, are female candidates affected by economic voting in the same way as male 
candidates? For example, would a voter seeking to punish their male incumbent for poor 
conditions decide to reelect him if the only alternative was a female? If so, this would 
confirm the existence of a blatant gender bias in U.S. politics and more clearly explain 
the role of the economy in the results of national elections. 
In order to investigate this issue more thoroughly, we will examine past 
Congressional elections and compare them to several macroeconomic indicators. We will 
look at Congressional elections beginning with the 107th Congress who were elected to 
serve starting in January 2001. To account for the economic state of the country, state-
level data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the 
Bureau of Energy Information will be used to summarize the various economic 
conditions. National-level data will be used to further explain what voters take into 
account when making decisions. Election data will come from Congressional Election 
Reports, which define incumbents and challengers, as well as their demographics and the 
result of the race. Using a multiple linear regression analysis, we will seek to find a 
correlation between good (poor) economic conditions and an increased percent of votes 
received by the incumbent (challenger). In addition, in order to analyze the effect of 
gender bias on election results, the data will include interaction terms between the 
incumbent gender dummy variable and the other variables. In this analysis, we expect to 
find that there will be a significant difference in voting patterns if the incumbent 
candidate is female. If this hypothesis proves correct, we believe it will provide a 
                                                
4 Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female 
Candidates."  
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significant insight into both the patterns of economic voting as well as how gender bias 
affects election rates for males and females across United States House elections. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 A. History of Economic Voting Research 
When considering how voters first begin to make their decisions, it is vitally 
important to define the indicators used to evaluate their candidates. Much early research 
in this area was based on V.O. Key’s seminal study that posits voters as an “electorate 
god of vengeance.” According to research done in The Responsible Electorate (1966), 
Key found that voters used past experiences to evaluate the performances of candidates. 
He showed that voters evaluated only their incumbent candidates and punished or 
rewarded them according to their interpretation of past or current economic conditions. 
Following Key’s work, Edward Tufte authored a similar study regarding midterm 
Congressional elections. He combined aggregate survey data on presidential approval 
ratings with aggregate economic data on the yearly change in real disposable income. 
While his study was mostly interested in analyzing the effect of presidential popularity on 
midterm elections, he found that a $50 change in real disposable income in the past year 
affected the vote by 1.8 percentage points (Tufte 1975). It seems almost unbelievable that 
a change as small as $50 could affect the vote by such a significant amount, however this 
may be the result of a relatively small window of observations where the change in real 
disposable income from year to year never exceeded $150. These studies were the 
foundation of the belief that changes in economic conditions between the past and the 
current election were what voters used to evaluate candidates. 
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But in Fiorina’s 1978 investigation, very little evidence was found to suggest that the 
electorate was voting using knowledge of past experiences. Using data from election 
surveys, Fiorina was able to measure whether respondents felt their economic condition 
had improved, worsened, or stayed the same over the past few years. Using this data in a 
regression, which also included data on similar survey questions regarding consumer 
prices and unemployment, he found that there is little evidence to support retrospective 
voting. However, we believe there are several problems with Fiorina’s analysis. First, the 
survey question does not clearly define the time period the respondent should consider. 
An individual could have fared worse in the “past few years” as a result of an incumbent 
who had already been voted out or even a personal financial matter, such as medical bills 
or a car accident. Regardless of these rather weak results, Fiorina’s work set the 
foundation for a series of studies that began to look at voter expectations as a replacement 
for, or an addition to, retrospective considerations. In some of the most recent literature, 
prospective voting has gained a serious foothold (Lewis-Beck 1988, Lockerbie 1991, 
Teixeira 1998). These studies use responses from election surveys or current population 
surveys to measure the level of optimism (or pessimism) the general electorate feels 
about the economy or the upcoming election. Similar to retrospective models, these 
studies expect to find that voters will elect an incumbent (challenger) when their 
expectations for the future are good (poor).  
However, we believe the use of prospective variables undermines the overall theory 
of economic voting. We have chosen to define economic voting as the idea that voters 
only consider the incumbent and evaluate their performance based on economic events. 
However, it is impossible to evaluate a candidate based on economic events that have not 
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yet occurred. Voter expectations, while a valuable measure of national economic 
optimism or pessimism, are not a valid measure of incumbent performance. As both 
Lewis-Beck (1988) and Erickson (1990) argue, both past experience and future hope 
determine much of vote choice. If we make the assumption that voters are rational actors, 
their behavior should seek to maximize their expected utility by using their past 
knowledge to judge incumbents' credibility and to cement their expectations. 
Expectations are a learned process largely built from past and current experiences. As 
such, the model will not use variables from election surveys such as the American 
National Election Studies (ANES) to measure voters’ future expectations as it is 
redundant to include expectations that are built from concrete experience. Expectations 
do not accurately represent the theory of economic voting as a method of rewards and 
punishments. Thus, we will instead use data to measure economic indicators during the 
election year and the year preceding to estimate the overall economic voting behavior of 
voters during election seasons. 
Past or future, the question now becomes, what do voters use to evaluate the 
economy? At this point, the research appears to be evenly split between collective or 
“sociotropic” and personal or “pocketbook” voting. Sociotropic voting considers the 
overall state of the economy using state and national-level economic indicators when 
evaluating candidates. Alternatively, pocketbook voting is when voters only consider 
their personal economic indicators such as disposable income or prices to measure their 
financial well-being and evaluate how a candidate has performed. Most of the earlier 
research tends to examine voters’ decisions by using their personal economic grievances, 
as revealed by changes in real income and unemployment in the years leading up to an 
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election (Kramer 1971, Fiorina 1978). Kramer examined nominal and real income, 
unemployment, and cost of living indices for the current and preceding year. Using a 
regression, he finds the coefficients on income (both nominal and real) to be highly 
significant in every case and that price indices are significant in some regressions, but not 
all. Similarly, using the survey data that asked individuals to state how their personal 
financial situation had changed in past years, in a logit regression Fiorina found that 
personal financial conditions are related to presidential election results. However, he did 
not find as convincing results when examining Congressional elections. While we 
maintain that the data used by Fiorina is not strong evidence to disprove retrospective 
voting behavior, it does an effective job of representing the influence of pocketbook 
indicators. 
 In 1979, Kinder and Kieweit published a study specifically analyzing personal 
economic discontent and found no connection between personal grievances and voting 
patterns. Using survey data, they took responses from questions such as “would you say 
that you (and your family) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year 
ago?” and “are you making as much money now as you were a year ago, or more, or 
less?” Using these responses as well as information regarding unemployment from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), they performed regressions on the elections between 
1956 and 1976. Of these eleven elections, only two were shown to have been 
significantly affected by personal economic conditions. However, we find the sources of 
data used in this study to be weak. These survey responses allow too much room for 
error, as personal grievances may have been caused by events completely unrelated to the 
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performance of a candidate and therefore likely only loosely related to a voter’s 
perception of their incumbent.  
Nevertheless, this study opened the door to a wave of research that moved away from 
personal economic grievances and toward a more collective interpretation of voting 
behavior. The theory of collective voting makes an important assumption that the average 
voter is aware of the state of the national economy and votes according to their 
expectations for the future. While this assumption may seem like a reach, according to 
surveys by the Pew Research Center, roughly 60% of respondents either “very closely” or 
“fairly closely” followed stories about the state of the U.S. economy in the prior week5. 
Similarly, the economy has been considered “very important” in elections by more than 
80% of respondents6 for the past six years. Therefore, we believe it is safe to make the 
assumption that the average voter is aware of the economy and considers it a high 
priority. However, it is important to note that while 60% of respondents “closely or fairly 
closely” followed stories about the U.S. economy, they may not have been following 
stories that examined issues such as inflation or GDP.  
As anyone who has turned on the news recently can tell you, only a select few 
economic indicators are regularly mentioned on television. A study by the Project for 
Excellence in Journalism found that during the Great Recession, only three major 
storylines accounted for nearly 40% of coverage on economic issues. These three were 
the bailout, the stimulus, and the auto industry. In fourth place, unemployment accounted 
                                                
5 "Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Poll." Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press. 
6 “Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Religion & Politics Poll.” Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press. 
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for just over 6% of total economic media coverage7. This could suggest that while voters 
are exposed to and follow storylines about the U.S. economy, they may only be exposed 
to a small percent of all the issues present. This same study also found an interesting 
correlation between a positive performance of the Dow and a decrease in media coverage 
about the economy. This could suggest that voters are bombarded with more economic 
news coverage when times are bad than when they are good, leading to a bias towards 
negative economic voting. 
Nagler and Niemann’s 1997 study of economic reference groups provides a 
framework that combines the concepts of pocketbook and sociotropic voting patterns. As 
they claim, the sociotropic theory posits that voters believe the state of the national 
economy is the best predictor of how the voter’s pocketbook will fare. The great deal of 
overlap between sociotropic and pocketbook voting is a result of voters’ understanding of 
the national economy being colored by their own hopes and experiences. Due to these 
connections, we believe that analyzing both types of voting provides a more well-
rounded explanation of voting behavior. We will use state-level data to serve as a proxy 
for pocketbook indicators. We believe analyzing state-level economic conditions such as 
real income and unemployment are as important as national factors, such as GDP growth 
and inflation.  
B. Demographic Effects 
In a country as large as the United States, the demographic differences are vast. As 
such, it would be impossible to assume that the interests of voters are the same regardless 
of their geographical and cultural differences. Fortunately, other researchers have noted 
                                                
7 Project for Excellence in Journalism. “Covering the Great Recession: How the Media Have Depicted the 
Economic Crisis During Obama’s Presidency.” Pew Research Center. 2011. 
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this problem and responded accordingly. Ebeid and Rodden (2006), Ansolabehere, 
Rodden, and Snyder (2006), and Levernier and Barrilla (2006) all address the issue of 
demographic and partisan differences across the country and how they affected voting 
patterns. Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder found that economic issues had a greater 
effect on the vote than moral issues and actually may be responsible for more of the 
divide between “regularly Republican” and “regularly Democratic” states than previously 
thought. They did find that socioeconomic status had a connection to economic policy 
preferences, with individuals with higher income tending to be more aligned with 
conservative policies. Ebeid and Rodden’s analysis focused more on the geography of the 
United States and the industrial sectors that were associated with different regions. They 
found that the cultural differences between rural and metropolitan economic structures 
had an effect on voting patterns with economic voting occurring most strongly in non-
rural and non-farming states. Finally, Levernier and Barrilla performed county-level 
analyses to determine how region and demographics affected the 2000 presidential vote. 
They found that a variety of different variables had an effect on voting, such as public 
assistance income, labor force participation, race, and religion. The results of these 
studies imply that demographic considerations will need to be included in order to reach a 
better understanding of the political economy of the United States. 
The demographic differences across the United States also likely have a connection to 
the varying expectations for female and male candidates across the country. The most 
obvious evidence comes from an article in which college students are asked to explain 
their preferences on a series of fictional elections (Fox and Smith 1998). The cultural and 
geographical differences that exist between California and Wyoming likely contributed to 
 20 
results where California students only favored men by about 1% whereas Wyoming 
students favored men by 10-12%. This stunning difference opens the door to deeper 
investigations into the regional and cultural divides that exist in the United States and the 
way those differences affect the political status of women.  
 C. Gender Bias 
While little research has yet to be performed on the effect of the economy as it 
specifically pertains to the success of female candidates, past research has explored how 
the economy relates to general candidate strength and success (Huddy and Terkildsen 
1993, Dolan 2004, King and Leigh 2010). In the investigations into political gender bias 
against women, many researchers have attempted to define whether it is voter or selection 
bias that is more harmful to female candidates. Selection bias is defined as a bias against 
females by a political party that has implemented barriers to entry against women (such 
as selecting them to run for unwinnable seats or running them against popular or 
unbeatable candidates) whereas voter bias is defined as the individual bias a voter may 
have against a female candidate. While some evidence of selection bias was found in an 
Australian study (King and Leigh 2010), no similar results were found in studies of the 
U.S. (Milyo and Schosberg 2000). It can be suggested then that the majority of bias 
against females comes not from parties, but from individual voters, as was seen in the 
study by Fox and Smith. 
In the U.S. political environment, females are not only disadvantaged by gender 
stereotypes but also policy stereotypes. In several studies, researchers found that women 
are viewed to have a stronger capacity to handle “compassion” issues such as poverty, 
health care, the elderly, education, children and family issues, and the environment 
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whereas men are more equipped to handle the economy and the military (Dolan 2004, 
Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Overall, the stereotypical traits of women as kind and 
compassionate hurts their image with issues that voters have decided require more 
masculine traits, such as strength or assertiveness. This is especially disadvantageous 
when we have already seen a great deal of evidence to prove that economic 
considerations are some of the most influential in voting behavior. If a female candidate 
is viewed as a weak competitor for economic policies because of gender bias, she faces a 
much more challenging battle for the vote. By interacting a gender variable with other 
variables, we will be better able to determine if a gender bias is what causes different 
patterns in voting behavior. 
Prior research into the area of economic voting and gender bias has built a foundation 
on which we would like to update and expand upon. With the convincing research 
conducted in the areas of retrospective voting, sociotropic voting, and pocketbook voting, 
we hope to combine all three considerations to better account for economic effects on 
voting patterns. In this way, this study will widen the scope from prior research. Since the 
years following 1999 have been economically tumultuous, we will also provide more 
recent and relevant results as the majority of the literature only analyzed elections prior to 
2000. Finally, we will expand our research to a new area of study by analyzing the effects 
of gender bias; a dimension that has not been adequately explored in existing studies. 
Specifically, this approach allows us to find the influence of economic conditions on 
voting patterns and whether these results are consistent regardless of gender. 
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III. Research Methods 
We examine past Congressional elections and compare them to the changes in 
several macroeconomic indicators over the previous 22 months. We look at eight 
Congressional elections beginning with the 107th Congress who were elected to serve 
starting in January 2001 and ending with data on the 114th Congress, who began their 
terms in January 2015. This set of Congressional elections will span a diverse sample of 
economic trends in the United States, from the Dot Com Boom in the early 2000s to the 
Great Recession beginning in late 2007.  
 Using the eight regions defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, numbers 
were assigned to the states within these regions and a random number generator was used 
to pick two states from each region. Since regional areas in the United States experience 
different economic conditions as a result of differing patterns of productive sectors, it is 
important that the data include samples from states in every geographical region but in a 
way that avoids selection bias. From the sixteen states that have been randomly selected, 
a random number generator randomly selects two races from each election year to decide 
which district’s elections to analyze. Since we are only interested in the effects of 
economic voting as it pertains to incumbent candidates, if the race randomly selected did 
not include an incumbent candidate, another race was chosen at random until each state 
had two incumbent races. Given these states and individual races, data from U.S. 
government bureaus were collected and compiled into a data set containing demographic 
variables for the incumbent and states, as well as economic indicators on the state and 
national level. 
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 This data will be used to run a multiple regression analysis. We expect to find a 
correlation between good (poor) economic conditions and an increase in the percent of 
the vote received by the incumbent (challenger). If this hypothesis is correct, it would do 
a great deal to explain some of the variation in voting patterns in the United States. In 
addition, in order to analyze the effect of gender bias on election results, we included an 
interaction term between the candidate gender dummy variable and the state 
unemployment variable and reestimated the regression. In this analysis, we expect to find 
a significant difference in the effect of being female on voting outcomes. Following the 
estimation of the models, we compare the predicted results to the actual election results 
and examine the discrepancies. 
 We believe that the role of gender in the U.S. political environment will lead 
voters to reelect a male incumbent regardless of poor economic conditions due to a 
negative bias towards female politicians. As such, we expect to find that any elections the 
model fails to correctly predict may be due to the presence of a female challenger. If this 
hypothesis proves correct, it will provide significant insight into how gender bias affects 
election rates for males and females across United States House elections. 
 
IV. Data 
The data set compiled is a unique collection of data from a variety of sources. 
First and foremost, the data regarding the percent of the general election received by the 
incumbent as well as their party affiliation was collected from the Congressional Election 
Reports that are published by the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Demographic information regarding each individual incumbent was 
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collected from their personal website or government profiles. Race and gender were 
determined based on visual examination of photos and name and age were set at the age 
they were in the election year. Given that voters also determine race and gender through 
the visual examination of their candidates, there should be little room for error in these 
variables. Tenure was measured in the number of terms previously served, and if an 
incumbent had served a partial term through a special election, it was considered a full 
term. We also only considered races in which there was an incumbent candidate and 
challenger(s). Districts that had an open seat or races where the incumbent ran unopposed 
were not included in the analysis.  
State demographic variables were collected from the 2000 and the 2010 Census. 
Election years 2000-2008 use data from the 2000 Census, and 2010-2014 uses 2010 
Census data. Variables on the male, white, and 65+ populations were measured as 
dummies, where 1 indicates that the state has a larger population than the national 
average. For instance, 72.4% of the U.S. population is white. If a state has a percentage of 
white population greater than or equal to 72.4%, it would be assigned a 1, whereas a state 
with less than 72.4% white population would be assigned a 0 for that variable. State-level 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis was used 
to define how well the selected states are doing economically and summarize their 
demographic composition. This data includes percent changes in unemployment levels, 
and income growth as well as other demographic variables that measure the composition 
of the state population’s gender division, racial division, and age. Information regarding 
changes in regional retail gasoline prices from the U.S. Energy Information Association 
(EIA) was included. We believe gas prices serve as the best proxy for a change in 
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consumer price indices as most voters are acutely aware of penny changes in gas prices 
while a change in price for a loaf of bread may go unnoticed.  
The economic indicators are measured as a percent change between January of the 
preceding year and October of the election year. The percent change in the 
unemployment rate was calculated using seasonally adjusted data from the BLS and 
stated as a percentage change, not a percentage point difference. They provide monthly 
data on the state level that was used to calculate a unique percent change in 
unemployment for each state for each election year. The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
provided data on personal income growth, GDP, real GDP, and per capita GDP. Personal 
income growth was the compounded annual growth rate between Q1 of the year prior to 
Q3 of the election year provided at the state-level. For all GDP data, the percent change 
was calculated at a state-level. Unfortunately, data has not yet been published for 2013 or 
2014, making change in GDP data unavailable for the 2014 election cycle. The EIA 
provided data on retail gas prices. The EIA have seven regions called Petroleum 
Administration for Defense Districts, or PADDs. Using this monthly data, the percent 
change in gas prices for states was calculated based on the PADD in which they were 
located. All these data were then imported into STATA and properly encoded. A 
summary of the variables and their definitions can be found in Table 1. 
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for all variables. Given the many dummy 
variables used for the demographic characteristics of incumbents, the composition of the 
data set is quickly made apparent. Of the 253 incumbents, 92% are white, 47% are 
Democrat, 13% are female and the average tenure is just under five terms. The economic 
variables are measured in percent changes from the previous January. While the mean 
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values all appear to suggest that unemployment, gas prices, personal income, and all GDP 
variables have risen steadily on average, these values can be deceiving. When examining 
the data more closely, the trends in growth and decline vary considerably from year to 
year. For example, unemployment was relatively steady until the Great Recession, at 
which point unemployment rates skyrocketed and then eventually began to fall starting in 
2012. Gas prices also steadily grew from 2000 until 2014, when they fell rapidly to some 
of the lowest prices the country had seen in years. As such, it is important to take these 
mean values with a grain of salt. The final variable to consider is that of 
“incumfemalestateunem.” This variable was created by interacting the incumbent female 
dummy variable with the variable on state unemployment. It is used later to measure the 
effect of changes in the unemployment rate on specifically female incumbents.  
 
V. Empirical Models 
In order to understand the impact of the economy on congressional election 
outcomes, we estimate three ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Each model 
will examine the relationship between the votes received by the incumbent candidate and 
economic conditions. The first and simplest model is defined as the following: 
(1)  PERCENTi = α + β1STATEUNEM + β2STATEGAS + ε1 
where PERCENT is the percent of the general election votes received by the incumbent, 
STATEUNEM is the percent change in state level unemployment from the previous 
January to October, STATEGAS is the percent change in regional level gas prices from 
the previous January to October, and ε is the error term. The second model includes 
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several explanatory variables regarding the demographics of the incumbent candidate and 
is estimated as: 
(2)   PERCENTi = α + β1STATEUNEM + β2STATEGAS + β3INCUMDEM + 
β4INCUMFEMALE + β5INCUMWHITE + β6INCUMTENURE + ε1 
where INCUMDEM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat, 
INCUMFEMALE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is female, 
INCUMWHITE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is white, and 
INCUMTENURE is the number of congressional terms served by the incumbent prior to 
the election. The third model takes the form of the second model but includes a single 
interaction term between INCUMFEMALE and STATEUNEM and takes the following 
form: 
(3)   PERCENTi = α + β1STATEUNEM + β2STATEGAS + β3INCUMDEM + 
β4INCUMFEMALE + β5INCUMWHITE + β6INCUMTENURE + 
β7INCUMFEMALESTATEUNEM + ε1 
 For each of these three specifications, we estimate the models during two 
different time periods; 2000-2012 and 2000-2014. The purpose of these two time periods 
is to isolate the effects of the Great Recession. In 2012, the economy and the general 
population were still recovering from the aftermath of the Great Recession and the 
economy still took the forefront in election concerns. However, in 2014, the economy had 
mostly recovered and the focus during election season had shifted to new concerns. As 
such, there are two estimates for each of the three models for a total of six different OLS 
estimations. 
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VI. Results 
The results for equations 1, 2, and 3 are listed in Table 3 for the time 
specifications A of 2000-2012 and B of 2000-2014. The values listed are the coefficients 
and the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
A.  Dropped Variables 
 Prior to defining the final three equations, regressions of every shape and size 
were run on the full data set. First, we were forced to eliminate most of the GDP 
variables due to their high levels of collinearity. Second, due to the lack of observations 
of state and national GDP from the 2014 election cycle, we were limited to using a data 
set of only 221 observations when including those variables rather than the full 253. 
Down to only the variables on real GDP for 2000-2012, we could not find statistical 
significance for any combination of regression attempts. There appeared to be simply no 
correlation between the percent of the vote received and the percent change in state or 
national real GDP. The same result was found with state personal income. There 
appeared to be very little to no correlation between a change in personal income and the 
general election vote. As a result, we were left with only state unemployment and state 
gas prices as economic variables. While difficult to let go of so many variables, their 
inclusion in the regression did not add any explanatory value and only hindered the 
degrees of freedom. We also believe the two remaining variables account for a significant 
amount of a voter’s understanding of the economy. Unemployment statistics are widely 
used in news media coverage and are easily and commonly interpreted as a 
comprehensive understanding of the condition of the national and state economy. Gas 
prices are also a wonderful proxy for the influence of price changes, given that voters 
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interact with gas prices on a nearly daily basis. High and low gas prices are the topics of 
friendly conversation and the population complains over even a penny’s change. As a 
result, we believe the remaining two variables provide a good measure of a voter’s 
economic knowledge. 
B. Equation 1 
The intention of equation 1 was to identify the effect of solely economic 
indicators on the results of general elections. 1A estimates that a 1% increase in 
unemployment will decrease the percent of the vote received by 5.27 percentage points 
and a 1% increase in gas prices will decrease the percent by 6.49 percentage points. The 
coefficient on unemployment is significant at the 1% level and gas prices are significant 
at the 10% level. Including data from the 2014 election, a 1% increase in unemployment 
and gas prices causes the vote received to decrease by 3.41 and 2.28 percentage points, 
respectively. In this specification, only state unemployment is significant and at the 10% 
level. These results follow the logic that the economy has a weaker effect on voting 
behavior when a major economic event is less prominent. 
C. Equation 2 
 Equation 2 includes an additional four variables, which seek to measure the effect 
of the characteristics of the incumbent candidate. Equation 2A estimates that a 
Democratic candidate receives an extra 2.90 percentage points over a Republican 
candidate, a female candidate receives 4.63 percentage points less than a male candidate, 
a white candidate receives 7.83 percentage points less than candidates of other races, and 
that for every additional term of tenure, an incumbent receives an additional 0.354 
percentage points. The coefficients for Democratic, white, and tenure are all significant at 
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the 5% level, while the coefficient on female candidates is significant at the 1% level. A 
surprising coefficient sign in this model is that of a white incumbent. We did not expect 
to find that white incumbents would receive less of the general vote than a person of 
color, and especially not by almost 8 percentage points. However, this could be explained 
by the extremely low number of non-white incumbents in the data set. Of the 221 
observations in this specification, only 16 were non-white. Of those 16, only six had less 
than three terms of prior tenure experience while nine had more than four terms of tenure 
experience. As such, the more tenured incumbents won their districts by a considerable 
margin. Ten of the elections were won by a margin greater than one standard deviation 
away from the predicted percent. These significant wins could lead the coefficient on 
white incumbents to a prediction that assumes nonwhite incumbents will perform better 
and that white incumbents will perform worse accordingly. The 2A equation also 
estimates a 1% increase in unemployment and gas prices will lead to a 5.38 and 5.66 
percentage point decrease in votes received, respectively. However, in this specification, 
only the coefficient on unemployment is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 With the inclusion of 2014 observations, equation 2B sees a loss in overall 
explanatory power from an R2 of .1448 in 2A to .1010 in 2B. The model estimates a 
Democratic incumbent will receive an additional 1.28 percentage points, a female will 
receive 3.44 fewer percentage points, a white incumbent will receive 6.23 fewer 
percentage points, and that every 1 term of tenure gives an additional 0.478 percentage 
points. Again, we see a similar result with the sign on the coefficient for white 
incumbents. This is likely a continuation of the effect that was mentioned previously. In 
this specification, the additional four nonwhite incumbents all received a percent of the 
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vote that was more than one standard deviation from the predicted mean, further 
solidifying the effect that white candidates will receive less of the general vote. The 
coefficients on females and white incumbents are both significant at the 5% level while 
the coefficient for tenure is again significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Democrat 
is not statistically significant in this model. A 1% increase in unemployment or gas prices 
causes a 3.34 and 1.67 percentage point decrease in vote received, respectively. Gas 
prices are again not significant but in this model, the statistical significance of 
unemployment has fallen from the 1% level in 2A to only the 10% level in 2B. This again 
suggests that the importance of economic factors declines when the country is more 
removed from an economic event such as the Great Recession.  
D. Equation 3 
 The final equation includes an interaction term that attempts to measure how 
differently women are affected by economic conditions. First, however, equation 3A 
estimates that a Democrat will receive an additional 3.01 percentage points, a female will 
receive 4.21 fewer, a white incumbent will receive 7.82 fewer, and for each prior term, an 
incumbent will receive 0.345 more percentage points in the general election. The 
coefficients on all four of these variables are significant at the 5% level. A 1% increase in 
gas prices leads to a 5.29 percentage point decrease but is not statistically significant. A 
1% increase in state unemployment leads to a decrease of 4.91 percentage points and is 
significant at the 5% level. The difference in significance between these two variables 
may be a result of the relative "importance" of gas prices versus unemployment rates. It 
may be that voters consider a change in the unemployment rate to be more important than 
a change in gas prices and react accordingly during the election. To measure this effect 
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specifically on female candidates, we created a variable that interacted the female dummy 
variable with the state unemployment variable. Then, after running the regression, an F-
test of joint significance was performed to find the P value for the two variables. The 
coefficient on the interaction term plus the coefficient on the state unemployment term 
equaled the coefficient for the effect of state unemployment on female candidates. For 
model 3A, the coefficient was -11.98, meaning that a female incumbent received 7.08 
percentage points less than a male for the same 1% increase in unemployment. The F-test 
found this coefficient to be significant at the 5% level. This solidifies our belief that 
female incumbents are punished more harshly for unemployment rates than are male 
incumbents.  
 Equation 3B estimates a Democrat will receive 1.36 additional percentage points, 
a female will receive 3.32 fewer, a white incumbent will receive 6.31 fewer, and a year of 
tenure gives an additional 0.465 percentage points. In this case, the coefficients on female 
and white are significant at the 5% level and tenure is significant at the 1% level. 
However, Democrat is not found to be statistically significant. This model does not find a 
change in gas prices or state unemployment to be statistically significant. We applied the 
same procedure to the addition of the interaction term and found that the coefficient of a 
change in unemployment on female incumbents to be -10.92; 8.07 percentage points 
more than for a male incumbent. A test of joint significance gave a P value of 0.1022, 
which can be considered marginally significant. This would suggest that the negative 
effect of higher unemployment rates on female candidates is both greater than for male 
incumbents and also marginally significant. As was seen in the previous models, the 
effect of economic indicators on a data set that includes observations from a time period 
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more removed from the Great Recession is weaker and less significant. While the 
interaction term in 3B was only marginally significant, the overall results from 3A and 
3B are clear; female incumbent candidates are punished more harshly for a negative 
economic effect than are male incumbents.  
E.  State Demographic Effects 
Given the prior research in this area, we were interested to see if the state 
demographics had an effect on the outcomes of the elections. When the state dummy 
variables were included in the regressions, they were consistently insignificant. They also 
caused the models to lose vital degrees of freedom and as a result, were dropped from the 
main models. In a second attempt to measure their effect on election outcomes, we 
generated the residual values from the predicted values of both time specifications. Then, 
using the residuals as the dependent variable, we ran regressions that included only the 
state dummy variables. Again, it was found that there was no statistical significance in 
these models. Finally, in an attempt to measure the effect of state demographics on 
female incumbents, interaction terms were created between the female incumbent dummy 
variable and the state white and state male variables. These variables were included in the 
regressions and then tested for joint significance. Yet again, there were no significant 
results. It may be that the variables created were not specific enough to measure the true 
effects of state demographics on election outcomes. Perhaps variables that measured 
urban and rural populations or levels of education would provide greater explanatory 
power. However, in this model, state demographics appear to have no significant effect 
on the outcomes of congressional elections for either male or female candidates. 
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F. Predicted Values and Wrongful Losses 
 Following the creation of the third equation, predicted values for both the A and B 
specifications of the model were generated. We also calculated the residuals from the true 
value for each of these specifications and examined the races where the predicted values 
fell more than two standard deviations from the true percentages. In each case, we then 
closely examined the incumbent and the surrounding details of the race. We expected to 
find predicted male losers as winners when pitted against a female challenger, but 
unfortunately, no such situation occurred. In fact, every incumbent who won or lost by 
more than two standard deviations from the predicted value faced off against a male 
challenger. While we hoped to find an indication of what caused these incumbents to win 
or lose by so much, there was no pattern to be found. However, there were interesting 
results when we examined the “wrongful” losers. In this situation, “wrongful” was 
defined as losers who were predicted to win by the model. Because of the two 
specifications, 2000-2012 and 2000-2014, we have two different predicted and residual 
variables. For the 2000-2012 specification, the model predicted that 24 of the 35 total 
female incumbent candidates lost when they should have won. This is a “wrongful loss” 
rate of 68%. For male incumbents in the same period, the model predicted that 108 of the 
218 total male candidates lost when they should have won. This gives a wrongful loss 
rate of 49.5%. While the model clearly does not predict vote percentages with complete 
accuracy, there is a significant discrepancy between 68% and 49.5%. For the 2000-2014 
specification, the wrongful loss rate for women is 51% while the wrongful loss rate for 
men is 50%. There is clearly much less of a discrepancy during this time specification. 
This further supports the hypothesis that women are more strongly affected by economic 
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events than men. As seen in the earlier results, the 2000-2012 specification always saw 
larger coefficients and stronger statistical significance in the economic variables. The 
interaction term between the female dummy variable and the unemployment changes was 
also larger and more statistically significant in the 2000-2012 specification. This suggests 
that the economy was a more important election issue in 2000-2012 and that women were 
more negatively affected by the increases in unemployment. This increased negative 
effect on women would support the stronger wrongful loss rate in the 2000-2012 
predicted results. As such, when the economy is a more important issue, women 
wrongfully lose at a higher rate.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 The importance of the economy in election results is undeniable, but there may be 
many factors that are not traditionally assumed to be important. The models suggest that 
the percent change in unemployment has a consistently large and significant effect on the 
outcome of a general election for Congress. However, the demographic characteristics of 
the incumbent candidate cannot be understated. Their addition to the model improved 
explanatory power by 300% and were consistently significant through each specification. 
It may in fact be that who you are in an election matters more than the political events 
happening around you. While experience has an undeniably significant effect, the 
coefficients on race, gender, and party affiliation are larger and sometimes equally 
significant. In fact, it is possible even for the effects created by demographic 
characteristics to outweigh the effect of the economy in the result of the election.  
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 Unfortunately, these demographic characteristics can work against female 
incumbents. As suspected, female incumbents see a larger negative effect of an increase 
in the unemployment rate. The true reasons for this impact are unknown, but it is likely 
that gender bias and policy stereotypes negatively affect female candidates who are 
running for reelection in a time of economic downturn. Because of the ingrained 
stereotypes against women as weak economic leaders, competent incumbents suffer when 
the economy suffers. Even a 0.1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
could cause a female incumbent to lose a full percentage point in a close race. 
Furthermore, our country is currently “represented” by a governing body that is 81% 
male, 80% white, and an average of 57 years old. The overwhelming male majority in the 
House represents a history of gender inequality and the longstanding tradition of male-
only politics. While women are certainly taking strides forward, the biases that lead to 
unfair and significant negative effects for female incumbents must be eradicated too. 
Until then, our Congressional elections cannot be considered truly fair. 
 Perhaps more troublesome for the political environment is the shockingly high 
incumbency reelection rate of around 95%. Even in our small sample, only 20 of the 253 
incumbents were not reelected. While it may be that the electorate is simply reelecting 
the best candidate year after year, we believe it more likely that voters simply do not 
investigate their other options and quickly reelect the name they recognize. Yet, there 
may still be some hope to be found. Our results showed that during elections that 
occurred closer to the aftermath of the Great Recession, economic indicators had a larger 
and more statistically significant effect on election outcomes. Of the 20 incumbents in the 
data set who were not reelected, 14 of them failed to be reelected in the 2008 and 2010 
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elections.  Beyond this data set, in the 2004 House election only seven incumbents lost 
reelection while in 2010, fifty eight incumbents lost reelection. This could suggest that in 
this time of economic turbulence and general dissatisfaction with our governing bodies, 
the electorate used their voting power to express their distaste. 
It is our hope that this study can be expanded upon in the future. We still have 
very high hopes for where this research can go. We would like to see this data set 
expanded to include all incumbent election races for every state going back decades. We 
believe the way the electorate treats their incumbent holds a key for a great deal of 
political analysis and understanding. We also believe that with the expansion of this data 
set, some of the original economic variables could be reintegrated and used to boost the 
explanatory power of these models. This research holds a great deal of potential for 
incumbents, challengers, political strategists, reporters, analysts, and the general voting 
electorate alike. We hope to see this research used to create further transparent analyses 
and combat election inequalities.  
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VIII. Appendix 
TABLE 1  Variable Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
percent 63.81573 10.0206 33.08 97.89 
year 2007.012 4.607174 2000 2014 
incumdem .4743083 .5003293 0 1 
incumfemale .1383399 .3459408 0 1 
incumwhite .9209486 .2703538 0 1 
incumtenure 4.885375 4.020619 1 27 
statemen .4940711 .5009559 0 1 
statewhite .798419 .4019761 0 1 
state65 .7193676 .4501988 0 1 
stateunem .0638051 .3145912 -.4028 1.1538 
stategas .2901329 .2239963 -.06992 .752311 
usgdp .0464379 .0169737 .0163058 .0664988 
stategdp .0485898 .0290803 -.0265138 .1403821 
usrealgdp .0230736 .0135334 -.0064534 .0393826 
staterealgdp .0255237 .0256168 -.0429289 .1033916 
uspercapgdp .0136943 .0131876 -.0157885 .027895 
statepercapgdp .0156673 .0242165 -.0546681 .0833291 
stateperinc .0451225 .0240762 -.004 .111 
incumfemalestateunem .005251 .0799069 -.25 .433 
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TABLE 2  Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
percent Percent of the general election vote received by the incumbent, measured from 0 
to 100 
year Year the election took place 
incumdem A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent was a Democrat 
incumfemale A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent was female 
incumwhite A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent was white 
incumtenure The number of terms previously served in Congress by the incumbent 
statemen A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state male population was equal or greater 
than the national male population 
statewhite A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state white population was equal or greater 
than the national white population 
state65 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state population over the age of 65 was equal 
or greater than the national population over 65 
stateunem Percent change in state unemployment levels from previous January to October of 
election year 
stategas Percent change in regional gas prices from previous January to October of 
election year 
usgdp Percent change in national GDP from previous January to October of election 
year 
stategdp Percent change in state GDP from previous January to October of election year 
usrealgdp Percent change in national real GDP from previous January to October of 
election year 
staterealgdp Percent change in state real GDP from previous January to October of election 
year 
uspercapgdp Percent change in national per capita GDP from previous January to October of 
election year 
statepercapgdp Percent change in state per capita GDP from previous January to October of 
election year 
stateperinc Percent change in personal income from previous January to October of election 
year 
incumfemalestateunem Dummy interaction variable between incumfemale and stateunem 
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